Economics and Resilience

Launching satellites is only half the battle. The real battle is for who can make the network financially sustainable: reduce the cost, recoup investments, and maintain a competitive price for the user.

OneWeb went through a difficult and dramatic path. The project effectively went bankrupt in 2020 and was saved thanks to government injections (primarily from the British government), and later – thanks to European and international consortiums. The last step was a merger with the French Eutelsat, which gave the company a new name and a new financial basis. But this “still life” of owners does not add speed to decision-making. On the contrary, Eutelsat OneWeb looks heavy and conservative against the backdrop of competitors: the business structure is complex, the market is mainly B2B and B2G, and decisions are made slowly. This provides a certain stability but limits the possibilities for maneuver and rapid scaling.

Starlink bet on an aggressive start and subsidies. Terminals were sold significantly below cost, and the costs of launching satellites were effectively subsidized by other SpaceX projects – primarily commercial launches. But the strategy worked: thanks to the scaling of production and dozens of launches on its own Falcon 9, the cost is gradually decreasing. At the same time, Starlink has already reached millions of users and stable cash flow.

The historical role of Ukraine remains underestimated here. It was the intensive and effective use of Starlink by the country’s defenders that became perhaps the best real-world demonstration of the technology’s potential. This use created a unique set of challenges – from cyberattacks and EW attempts to direct countermeasures from Russian state structures. As a result, SpaceX hardened both its own technologies and its team of specialists, learning to repel attacks and increasing the system’s resilience. But there is another side: Elon Musk’s unilateral decisions to limit Starlink’s availability in the occupied territories caused a loud international reaction. For many governments, this became a signal: it is too dangerous to rely on one private provider. And it was this that spurred the development of alternatives – from the activation of investors in OneWeb to the plans for new national and regional constellations.

Kuiper has a different balance. On the one hand, Amazon must invest billions in launch and production. For this, the company has pre-booked more than 80 launches from several suppliers: ULA (Vulcan), Arianespace (Ariane 6), and Blue Origin (New Glenn). This is the largest commercial launch contract in history, and it shows the scale of Kuiper’s ambitions. But the key problem is that the main “workhorses” – Vulcan and New Glenn – have not yet gone through the entire testing cycle. So Amazon has to plan deployment based on the expectation of when the partner’s rockets will finally be ready for regular work.

Amazon has a significant advantage: huge financial resources and a ready-made AWS cloud infrastructure. This allows it to “digest” the costs longer and more painlessly than its competitors. In the short term, terminals and services will likely also be sold below cost to enter the market. But in the long term, Kuiper can become self-sufficient precisely because of its integration with Amazon’s existing business – where satellite internet will not be a separate product, but another layer of a global ecosystem.

The economics of LEO networks is always a balance between capital and speed. OneWeb – stability through consortiums and state support, but limited flexibility. Starlink – domination through subsidies, scaling, and combat hardening in Ukraine, and at the same time, the risk of a monopoly that stimulates the emergence of competitors. Kuiper – financial power and integration with the Amazon business empire, which allows it to withstand a long game, albeit with a dependence on the readiness of new partner rockets.

The broader context is also important. In recent years, the space and satellite industry has lowered the “price threshold” for entry: announcements of new LEO projects no longer surprise anyone. Ambitious players such as Telesat Lightspeed, Rivada, Kepler Communications, as well as “pocket” startups with dozens of nanosatellites, are appearing on the market. China is also openly demonstrating its ambitions – from the state program Guowang (tens of thousands of satellites) to commercial initiatives by Geely (Geespace) and other private companies. Forecasts speak of more than 100,000 satellites in orbit by the end of 2030. But despite this barrage of announcements, the largest part of this number will likely belong to the three giants: Starlink (with a declared 40-50 thousand satellites), Kuiper (more than 3 thousand), and OneWeb (several thousand). So, by the end of the decade, they will be the ones who will determine the look and economics of the market, while the rest of the players will occupy niche segments.

Conclusions

When we talk about satellite mega-constellations, the biggest temptation is to count the number of satellites. Whoever has more is stronger. But this is a false logic. The reality is much more complex: the success of a network is determined not by the number of satellites, but by how the entire ecosystem is built – from the architecture of the satellites and ground infrastructure to the business model and strategic vision.

Starlink created the largest and most powerful fleet, became a monopolist in the mass segment, and literally “collapsed” prices for satellite internet worldwide. But at the same time, it also got a zoo of generations, a problem with failures, and a dependence on the personal decisions of Elon Musk, which cause waves of reactions in global politics.

Eutelsat OneWeb survived bankruptcy, rescue with state money, and a merger. This made the company cautious, even overly so – in a world where speed has become the main asset. The bet on the B2B and B2G segments provides stability but takes away the chance for mass expansion.

Kuiper is starting later but has a resource cushion that no one else has. Amazon can afford long investment cycles, and Kuiper’s main strength is in its merger with the existing business empire: AWS, logistics, e-commerce. It’s not just a satellite network, but a superstructure over a gigantic global infrastructure.

Together, they form the core of a new satellite world. And it is they, not dozens of smaller projects, who will determine the look of the orbits by the end of the decade. Because even if in the 2030s we really have more than 100,000 satellites in orbit, a significant part of that number will belong to them.